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I. INTRODUCTION
I was not certain I was going to write something for this symposium.
After all, I had written a lot on the topic of self-defense, so what was there
left to say that I had not said before?1 I have concluded, however, after
reading a new generation of literature on self-defense, that most who write
on the topic neglect its perhaps most important aspect, namely, that it is a
preemptive action. As a preemptive action, self-defense perforce takes
place before the attack to which it is a response occurs. This preemptive aspect

*
© 2018 Larry Alexander. Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San
Diego School of Law. Thank you to all the participants at the conference on self-defense
jointly sponsored by the University of Hong Kong and our School of Law’s Institute for
Law and Philosophy.
1. See generally, e.g., Larry Alexander, Recipe for a Theory of Self-Defense: The
Ingredients, and Some Cooking Suggestions, in THE ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 20, 20–50
(Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016).
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of self-defense brings with it a nest of theoretical problems to which those
who write about self-defense too infrequently advert.2
II. PRELIMINARIES
I will lay out those problems as fully as I can. As a preliminary matter, let
me put aside some issues. First, I will not ask whether the defender might
be excused for acting preemptively.3 To avoid bringing excuse into the
analysis, I shall assume the defender is not the potential victim (V) of the
feared attack but is rather a third party (TP) coming to V’s defense. TP’s
lack of culpability for preemptive action cannot be based on excuses such
as fear for self or family. Only V’s lack of culpability for preemptive action
can be based on such fears.
Second, having put excuses aside, I also want to point out that justification
is, as a strict matter, also ruled out. Why? For the simple reason that if
TP takes preemptive action and eliminates the possibility of attack, we
will never know whether that attack and the harm it portends would have
occurred. Justifications are based on the facts. But a harmed potential
aggressor and unharmed V do not by themselves create a state of affairs
that is necessarily better than the state of affairs that would have occurred had
TP not acted.
Nor does throwing in probabilities help here. Probabilities are relative
to a person’s information and perspectives. Only for God are they objective—
one or zero. All we can say is that from TP’s perspective, the state of
affairs that will exist if TP acts to prevent the feared attack will, TP believes,
probably be preferable to the state of affairs that will obtain if TP abstains.
At the least, TP believes that there is a high enough probability that, if TP
acts, the state of affairs will be preferable to the state of affairs if TP
abstains and thus justifies TP’s acting. And if that is what TP believes,
then TP will not be culpable for acting preemptively. TP’s culpability—
not whether TP is justified—is the proper focus.
As an aside, I should also note that the same analysis may be applied to
the so-called lesser evils justification when it prescribes preemptive action.
If the preemptive action prevents the course of events from occurring that
would have been the greater evil had it occurred, but that course of events
was not a certainty in the absence of the preemptive action, then although
the actor may not have been culpable for acting preemptively, only God
could say whether the actor was justified.

2. For an exception, see generally Vera Bergelson, Self-Defense and Risks, in THE
ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 131, 131–51 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016).
3. Or, if some think it different, whether the defender has an agent-relative permission to
do so.
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III. PROBABILITIES ALL THE WAY DOWN
Most of the literature on self-defense “[a]ssume[s] a can opener.”4 What I
mean is that the analysis begins with several stipulations. The putative
aggressor (A) is culpable, or A is innocent. A will kill V unless V—or
TP—kills A, breaks A’s arm, or does some such thing. In other words, we
already know things about A and V—or TP—which only God knows for
certain.5
Don’t get me wrong: The God’s-eye perspective is important. Unless
we know what ought and ought not be done when we are certain about the
relevant facts, we cannot know what ought and ought not be done when we
are less than certain—as we always will be. The God’s-eye perspective is
necessary when theorizing about preemptive defense, but it is surely not
sufficient and thus not sufficient for assessing the actions of the defender in
our case, TP. TP cannot know for certain whether A is culpable or
innocent, whether A will actually attack V if not stopped, and whether V
will be harmed. Additionally, TP cannot know the extent V will be harmed
if A does attack V. Finally, TP cannot know for certain what particular
measures will prevent A’s attack and what their consequences will be.
Suppose TP observes A approaching V. Here are the questions TP must
answer in deciding whether to take some defensive action against A.
1. Does A presently intend to attack V if not stopped?
2. Or, if A does not presently intend to attack V, will A form such
an intent as he approaches V?

4. The can opener is a reference to a joke making light of how economists make
their predictions by assuming unlikely or impossible scenarios. The joke goes: a physicist, a
chemist, and an economist are stranded on a desert island with nothing but a can of food.
The physicist and the chemist devise creative solutions to open the can, but they do not
succeed. The economist then says, “Let’s just assume we have a can opener.” Joshua M.
Brown, Assume a Can Opener, REFORMED BROKER (Nov. 4, 2015), http://thereformedbroker.
com/2015/11/04/assume-a-can-opener/ [https://perma.cc/9KLS-Y78K].
5. Uwe Steinhoff’s 227-page discussion of self-defense is representative; I found
only three places where he acknowledges that the actors in self-defense scenarios cannot
be certain about the predicaments they are in or the consequences of their actions or
omissions. Uwe Steinhoff, Just War Theory: Self-Defense, Necessity, and the Ethics of
Armed Conflicts 53, 71, 96 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). In the
overwhelming majority of Steinhoff’s examples, the actors are dealing with certainties
regarding self-defense matters.
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3. If A intends, or will intend, to attack V, will A actually carry
through and do so if not stopped by TP, or will A relent on
A’s own?
4. If A will attack V, will V be harmed, and to what extent?
5. If A will attack and harm V unless stopped, will A’s act
nonetheless be justified? That is, are there facts about V
that would make harming V justified? If TP believes A will
be justified in harming V, then even if A is culpable—
perhaps A does not believe the justifying facts exist that TP
believes exist—TP would not be acting nonculpably in
preventing A’s attack.
6. Is A a culpable or an innocent aggressor if A does intend to
attack V? A may be an innocent aggressor if A aggresses
based on a mistake about the situation, if A is not a morally
responsible agent, if A acts under duress, or if A acts in
defense of A’s spouse or child. If A is a culpable aggressor,
A’s culpability is not of the type that attaches to acts that
have unleashed the risk of harm. Rather, it is the type of
culpability that warrants preemptive action but not retributive
punishment. It is predicated on the intent to unleash a risk
of harm in future circumstances that A does not believe are
such that would justify A’s unleashing that risk.
7. If TP’s beliefs about (1)–(6) lead TP to believe he or she
must act preemptively to stop A, TP must then consider:
a. What is the likelihood of success of each possible
defensive measure?
b. How much is A likely to be harmed by each defensive
measure?
c. What risk or sacrifice does TP incur with each possible
defensive measure?
d. How much are the probabilities of (a)–(c) affected by the
passage of time?
Notice that items (1) and (2) are merely factors for determining the
likelihood of (3)—that is, A will attack V. However, someone might argue
that although the probabilities of both (2) and (3) are very high, if the
probability of (1) is very low, TP will be culpable for preemptively attacking
A. For, they might say, if A does not presently harbor an intent to attack
V, TP may not attack A—no matter how likely it is that A will attack V,
how likely V will suffer serious harm or death, and how unlikely TP will
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be able to avert A’s attack if TP must wait for A to form the intent to attack
V.6 What is the right answer here? The extant literature is silent.
Here is another undertheorized issue. Suppose TP believes it highly
probable that A will attack V. Suppose TP also believes the likelihood of
V’s suffering serious injury or death as a result of A’s attack is very low.
May TP preemptively attack V—and, if so, with what severity—in such a
situation? For instance, suppose A has a ten-chambered revolver containing
one live round and is pointing the revolver at V. TP, per hypothesis, is
confident A will pull the trigger but believes the chance of V’s suffering
death or injury is 10% discounted by the vagaries of A’s aim. One might
argue that if A would be culpable for pulling the trigger, even a slight
chance of V’s suffering a serious injury or death would make TP’s deadly
preemptive defensive attack on A nonculpable. But TP cannot know A would
be culpable. A might be maliciously playing involuntary Russian roulette
on V. On the other hand, A might not realize there is a live bullet in one
chamber, or that the gun is a real gun. Or A may believe facts about the
situation that, if true, would make his pulling the trigger nonculpable.
Thus, for TP to determine whether A is a culpable aggressor, TP would have
to assess the likelihoods of these various possibilities. Because TP can
never be 100% certain A will be culpable in attacking V, what probability
of A’s culpability less than 100 percent would make TP’s deadly preemptive
attack on A nonculpable?
One thing the Russian roulette example above appears to rule out is this:
TP can only employ defensive force against A without culpability if TP
believes the overall probability that A will harm V unless TP uses force against
A is greater than 50%—that is, more likely than not. For even if TP believes
the probability that A will pull the trigger—the probability that A will or
does intend to pull the trigger times the probability that A will act as he
intends—is nearly 100%, the probability of serious harm to V is considerably
less than 50%. Yet, most would think TP nonculpable for using force to
prevent the Russian roulette attack by A even if the probability that V will
be harmed by it is far less than 50%.
Then there are the probabilities referred to in (7).7 Suppose TP’s culpability
for preemptively attacking A turns on matters of proportionality and necessity.
Proportionality will itself turn on the probabilities in (4)—whether and to

6.
7.

See supra Section III(7)(d).
See supra Section III(7).
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what extent A’s attack will harm V if not averted.8 With respect to necessity,
suppose TP can attack A with a revolver in the ballroom, with a high
probability of averting A’s attack, a high probability of A’s suffering
death or serious injury, and TP’s expending little energy and facing little
danger. Alternatively, TP can attack A with the lead pipe in the conservatory,
with a moderate probability of averting A’s attack, a moderate probability
of A’s suffering serious injury, and TP’s expending a fair amount of energy
and facing some danger. Finally, TP can attack A with a candlestick in
the dining room, with a still lower but positive probability of averting A’s
attack, a low probability of seriously injuring A, and an increased probability
of TP’s suffering serious injury. How are the necessity and proportionality
of TP’s attack to be determined, given these three variables and the various
probabilities attached to them?
IV. CONCLUSION
My object in this short paper is not to provide algorithms for answering
the questions I have raised. It is the more modest, but I believe vitally
important, task of placing a neglected item on the agenda of those engaged
in theorizing self-defense and other preemptive actions. Whatever certainties
exist in life, they do not inhabit the realm of preemptive defense. So,
theorists who derive their normative conclusions from stipulated certainties
will fail to provide answers usable in the real world.9

8. See supra Section III(4).
9. Suppose that correctly applying the several factors listed above results in a
verdict that TP will be culpable if he defends V against A with whatever force he has
chosen to employ. For example, TP might have insufficient credence that A is attacking
V or that A is a culpable aggressor. Alternatively, TP might be culpable because he fails
to have the required beliefs about necessity—he may believe that he can effectively avert
A’s attack with less force than he intends to use and can do so with acceptable levels of
safety and effort. So, per hypothesis, TP will be culpable for attacking A as he intends.
Suppose now that A is a culpable aggressor. TP will be a culpable aggressor against A,
but A is a culpable aggressor against V. And suppose another third party, TP2, believes
these things with an appropriately high level of credence. May TP2 nonculpably use force
to thwart A or TP, and if so, against which one? Now suppose, in place of TP in our
example, it is V who has insufficient credence that A is attacking him and is culpable for
doing so; or suppose that V cannot show that, given his beliefs, the force he intends to use
to defend against A meets the necessity or retreat requirements. Nor can V show grounds
for an excuse. So, V will be culpable for attacking A. But again, suppose that A is a culpable
aggressor against V. May a third party who believes these things nonculpably assist either
A or V, and if so, which one? In both scenarios, the potential intervener believes both A
and TP in the first scenario, and A and V in the second, will be culpable if they act as they
intend. Therefore, one might contend the potential intervener should not intervene on
either side. On the other hand, although TP in the first scenario and V in the second will be
culpable for acting as they intend, they are responding defensively to a would-be culpable attacker,
A. So, as between culpable A and culpable TP and V, the equities may seem to favor the
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latter. Furthermore, although it might seem perverse for the potential intervener to intervene on
the side of A, who, after all, is the attacker not the defender, it might matter why A is
culpable in attacking and why TP or V is culpable in responding.
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